Empathy, Subjectivity, and Testamentary
Capacity
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The law of wills seems to set itself an impossible task. It is premised on the importance of effectuating a person's wishes as to the
disposition of his or her property after death. Courts may not judge
the wisdom of those wishes because the testator's ends are personal
and individual to him or her alone. To ascertain the intent of persons
who can no longer communicate with us directly, we must attempt,
on some level, to know them, to enter into their personal experiences
and the thoughts and feelings resulting from such experiences. In
short, we must empathize with them. Yet if values are truly individual, empathy is problematic: the best faith attempts to understand
another person may fail - indeed, they probably are doomed to fail.
In such instances, we are left to impose our wishes and values on the
testator instead of effectuating the testator's own desires.
This difficulty is inherent in liberal notions of individuality. If, as
the law of wills seems to suppose, each individual's desires and values are subjective and personal to him or her alone, then they are
necessarily unknowable to others. The goal of wills law appears impossible to achieve.
The law of testamentary capacity illustrates the dilemma. In assessing a testator's mental capacity to make a will, courts consistently and candidly hold that the fact finder may consider, along with
other factors, whether the testator's disposition of his property is
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substantively "reasonable" or "natural." Indeed, it has been demonstrated persuasively that the substantive rationality of a testamentary disposition is often the primary determinant of results in capacity cases.' If a particular disposition, in the abstract, can be proof of
mental incapacity, then presumptively there must be some dispositions which no mentally competent person freely could intend. Such
a presumption requires faith that there are some values that no sane
person could hold and, conversely, that some values are held in common by everyone. This faith is wholly inconsistent with the idea that
wills law must neutrally effectuate individual intent.
In practice, although courts freely admit wills as evidence in testamentary capacity cases, they rarely examine any will provision in the
abstract without also evaluating other evidence of the testator's experiences and beliefs. Some courts adopt what appears to be an objective standard for evaluating mental capacity, a standard which
turns on the testator's abstract ability to "reason." Yet in assessing
whether the testator indeed has engaged in the requisite process of
reasoning, the critical factor is not whether the will's provisions are
rational in any abstract sense, but whether they are such as might
have been expected from one in the testator's position. Other courts
reach the same result directly, by defining capacity explicitly as conformity with a testator's peculiar and individual beliefs and concerns. In all cases, then, the finder of fact is effectively required to
empathize with the testator.
This Article argues, on the basis of that empathy, that wills law is
far less conventionally individualistic than oftentimes is thought. If
each individual's values truly were subjective, then there would be no
means by which those values could be discovered, and the purported
premise of wills law would be empty and absurd. But in testamentary capacity cases courts manifest a faith that humans can know
others without inappropriately imposing their own values.
Of course, empathy carries risks: the finder of fact may be unable
totally to cast aside his or her own beliefs in the attempt to grasp
another's. Those risks, however, are no different from those incurred
in ordinary lifetime interactions between disparate individuals. "Testamentary intent" in reality differs but little from any person's
wishes during life. Like lifetime thoughts and desires, all that can be
known of the testator's intent is what can be imperfectly gleaned
through empathy.
The first section of this Article describes the doctrine of testamentary capacity and explores its connection to liberal ideas of individualism. The task of the mental capacity requirement is to ensure that
1. Green, Proofof Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise,
53 YALE L.J. 271 (1944) [hereinafter Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency].
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a legally enforceable testamentary intent exists. The task of the
courts is to discover that intent without judging the testator's ends.
The second section describes the tests courts have adopted for assessing mental capacity, and demonstrates their potential to conflict
with the notion that values are subjective. Attempts to define mental
capacity reflect two themes, one focusing on the testator's ability to
engage in a process of "reasoning," the other focusing on whether
the testator's will is consistent with the beliefs and values he or she
seemed to embrace during life. While both themes seek objectively
to effectuate choices that they regard as fundamentally subjective
and idiosyncratic, neither is capable of doing so.
The third section illustrates how pervasively courts rely on empathy as a means of assessing capacity when a will's dispositive provisions are unconventional and controversial. Even those courts which
purport in such cases to evaluate the testator's abstract ability to
reason actually assess capacity by comparing the testator's will with
what is known of his or her lifetime preferences and peculiarities. To
make that comparison, the fact finder is asked to empathize with the
testator.
The fourth section explores the relation between the use of empathy and the premise of wills law. Wills law presupposes complete
neutrality with respect to the testator's wishes. Empathy cannot
achieve that neutrality. Thus, when courts utilize empathy to assess
a testator's intent, they accept the impossibility of discovering the
testator's pure subjectivity.
Finally this Article suggests that other doctrines of wills law depend more heavily on empathy than commonly has been assumed. In
interpreting wills, as in determining capacity, courts require the
finder of fact to step into the testator's shoes and see the world from
his or her perspective. That requirement implies a distinct view of
the world as a community, not of individuals isolated from each
other in their own subjectivity, but of individuals linked to one another by their willingness to abandon themselves for others in the
faith that others one day will do the same for them.
THE PREMISE OF WILLS LAW AND THE REQUIREMENT OF MENTAL
CAPACITY

The "basic premise" of the law of wills is to ensure owners "the
widest possible latitude in disposing of their property in accordance
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with their own wishes whether they be wise or foolish." 2 There are
obvious and important limitations on the freedom granted the testator: elective share statutes prevent testators from completely disin-

heriting their spouses; 3 pretermission statutes bar testators from dis-

inheriting children without explicit mention; 4 and estate taxes

prevent testators from transmitting huge blocks of property intact.5
These limitations are regulatory in purpose and effect. They are
designed not to effectuate private intent, but to defeat it in furtherance of explicitly identified social goals.' Nevertheless, outside the
2. E. CLARK, L. LUSKY & A. MURPHY, GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS I (3d ed.
1985). Though some cases hold testamentary freedom to be a natural right (see, e.g.,
Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W. 625 (1906)), the vast majority of courts
agree that freedom of testation exists solely by virtue of legislative grant. See, e.g., Irving
Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942) ("Rights of succession to the property of a
deceased, whether by will or by intestacy, are of statutory creation, and the dead hand
rules succession only by sufferance.")
No a priori reason exists to permit freedom of testation. The existence of statutes of
descent and distribution demonstrates that the state is perfectly capable of disposing of
property after its owner's death. This paper will not examine the numerous arguments
for and against testamentary freedom. On free testation generally, see Cohen, The Birthright of Esau, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 27 (1933); 1 R. ELY, PROPERTY AND
CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS To THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALrH 415-43 (1914);
Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 139, 145-46 (1936); Friedman,
The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property, Succession, and Society, 1966
Wis. L. REV. 340; Halbach, An Introduction to Chapters 1-4, in DEATH. TAXES AND
FAMILY PROPERTY 3 (E. Halbach ed. 1977); MeMurray, Liberty of Testation and Some
Modern Limitations Thereon, 14 ILL. L. REV. 96 (1919); Morton, The Theory of Inheritance, 8 HARV. L. REV. 161 (1894).
3. Elective share statutes allow the surviving spouse a choice between taking
under a decedent's will or renouncing the will and taking a statutory share of the decedent's estate. The share may be a third, a half, or an intestate share of the estate. J.
DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS. TRUSTS. AND ESTATES 400 (3d ed. 1984). States
vary on whether and to what extent property other than that in the decedent's probate
estate is included in the elective share. Id. at 408. For one approach, see U.P.C. §§ 2201, 2-202 (1982).
4. See, e.g., U.P.C. § 2-302.
5. The federal estate and gift tax provisions are codified in I.R.C. §§ 2001-2622
(1986).
6. The purpose of elective share statutes is to protect the surviving spouse by
providing necessary support and by allowing the spouse to participate in gains achieved
by the decedent during marriage. L. SIMEs, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 22
(1955); Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom - A Report on Decedents' Family Maintenance Legislation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 277, 313 (1955); Rheinstein,
Book Review, 59 MICH. L. REV. 806, 810 (1961) (reviewing W. MACDONALD, FRAUD
ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE (1960)). For other views of elective share statutes, see Haskell,
The Power of Disinheritance:Proposalfor Reform, 52 GEO. L.J. 499, 525 (1964) ("I
believe that consanguinity may be justification in and of itself for claim to some portion
of the property of the decedent"); Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the
Uniform Probate Code: In Search of an Equitable Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REV. 98 1,
1061 (1977) and Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a
Problem, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1966) (mentioning the possibility that a disinherited
spouse may become a financial burden on society); Kulzer, Property and the Family:
Spousal Protection,4 RUT.-CAm. L.J. 195 (1973) (arguing that elective share laws serve
to reinforce the traditional roles of men and women in the family structure). Another
means of protecting the spouse is the system of community property. See generally 2
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regulatory limits, the premise of wills law is facilitative 7
intent, be it "wise or foolish," controls.

individual

§§ 7.1-7.5 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
Pretermission statutes do not require the testator to leave anything to his or her children, but provide some measure of protection to the children by requiring that disinheritance be express. Arguably the statutes in fact protect the testator, who is presumed to
wish to benefit his or her children in the absence of explicit evidence to the contrary. For
discussions of pretermission statutes, see Dainow, Inheritance by PretermittedChildren,
32 ILL L. REV. I, 10 (1937); Evans, Should PretermittedIssue be Entitled to Inherit?,
31 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (1943); Haskell, supra, at 507; King, Statutory Status of
PretermittedHeirs, 13 B.U.L. REV. 672 (1933); Mathews, PretermittedHeirs: An Analysis of Statutes, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 748 (1929).
The goals of estate taxation primarily are the raising of revenue and the reduction of
inequalities in the distribution of wealth. See generally Boskin, An Economist's Perspective on Estate Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 56 (E. Halbach ed.
1977); Blum & Kalven, The Uneasy Casefor Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV.
417 (1952); Chester, Inheritanceand Wealth Taxation in a Just Society, 30 RUTGERS L.
REV. 62 (1976); Van Doren, RedistributingWealth by CurtailingInheritance: The Community Interest in the Rule Against Perpetuities and the Estate Tax, 3 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 33 (1975); Verbit, Do Estate and Gift Taxes Affect Wealth Distribution?, 117 TR.
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY

& EST. 674 (1978).

Other statutes protecting the family are homestead laws, see generally I AMERICAN
§ 5.114 (A. Casner ed. 1952), and laws (now becoming rare) restricting property owners' power to make charitable gifts, see E. CLARK, L. LUSKY, & A.
MURPHY, supra note 2, at 192-94.
7. Green, Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency, 38
MICH. L. REV. 1189, 1206 (1940) [hereinafter Green, Public Policies]:
[W]hen a court gives effect to a will as made by a testator it is granting to
him certain limited powers of sovereignty. The legislature of the state has already declared in its statute of descents and distributions how property shall be
distributed upon the death of its owner. But, by another statute - the statute
of wills - it has permitted the testator to disregard the statute of descents and
distributions, and, within certain limits, to legislate for himself.
The statement made in the text warrants one qualification. State statutes set forth detailed requirements for executing a will. Unless the requirements are satisfied, the document will not be given effect as a "will." The execution formalities of wills law thus may
defeat the testator's intent. Yet, despite their potential to defeat intent, formalities are
facilitative in purpose:
Formalities are premised on the lawmaker's indifference as to which of a number of alternative relationships the parties decide to enter. Their purpose is to
make sure, first, that the parties know what they are doing, and, second, that
the judge will know what they did. These are often referred to as the cautionary and evidentiary functions of formalities....
[T]he formality means that unless the parties adopt the prescribed mode of
manifesting their wishes, they will be ignored. The reason for ignoring them,
for applying the sanction of nullity, is to force them to be self conscious and to
express themselves clearly, not to influence the substantive choice about
whether or not to contract or what to contract for. ...
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1691-92 (1976) (footnote omitted). For further discussion of the functions of Wills Act
formalities, see Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J.
1 (1941), and Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV.
489 (1975).
LAW OF PROPERTY
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Conceptually, this premise requires that the testator have an intent; if he or she does not, there is nothing for the law to effectuate.
The requirement of mental capacity can be understood, then, as a
function of wills law's premise: it guarantees that the testator is capable of forming the intent which the law is designed to protect. 8
This perspective illustrates the individualism of wills law - the intent which the law carries out must be generated by the testator.
The mental capacity requirement ensures that the wishes appearing
in the will "truly" are the testator's own.
All state statutes governing wills therefore require mental capacity. They provide that a testator muft have a sound mind, or sound
mind and memory, or sound and disposing mind and memory. 9 Yet,
as a leading treatise notes, the mental capacity requirement "for all

practical purposes, is a matter of case law, for the statutory requirement is so short and so general in its wording as to be meaningless
and useless in arriving at a workable definition." 10 While the cases
vary in precise formulation,11 the following standard is accepted in
substance in all jurisdictions:
Testator must have sufficient strength and clearness of mind and memory,
to know, in general, without prompting, the nature and extent of the property of which he is about to dispose, and [the] nature of the act which he is
about to perform, and the names and identity of the persons
2 who are to be
the objects of his bounty, and his relation towards them.'

If a testator meets this standard, his or her will must be carried
8. See Epstein, Testamentary Capacity, Reasonableness and Family Maintenance: A Proposalfor Meaningful Reform, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 231, 233 (1962) ("As the

word 'will' denotes, the disposition is to be that which is intended by the testator. If the
testator, as a result of insufficient mental capacity, is unaware of the fact or manner in
which he is disposing of his property, he is not exercising his 'will.' ") See also J. ALEXANDER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF WILLs § 354 at 480 (1917) ("A will is the child
of the mind, but when the mind is dead, there can be no offspring"); Langbein, supra
note 7, at 491 ("The many rules governing testamentary capacity and the construction of
wills are directed to two broad issues of testatmentary intent: did the decedent intend to
make a will, and, if so, what are its terms?").
It has been suggested that the view that "intent" or "will" is required for the making
of a will "is more in accord with an earlier era in our law when mind was considered a
separate and distinct entity." Green, Public Policies, supra note 7, at 1205. See also id.
at 1194-97 (discussing the relation between certain views of mental disorder and philosophical dualism). Green elsewhere notes that courts "do not, like the psychologists and
psychiatrists, purport to be examining behavior - they still purport to be examining the
'mind' of the individual, that distinct entity which exists separate and apart from the
body." Green, Judicial Tests of Mental Incompetency, 6 Mo. L. REV. 141, 145 (1941)
[hereinafter Green, Judicial Tests]. However, he argues, courts in fact "base their judgments, just as the psychiatrists do, upon the behavior of the person investigated, only
they do not admit they are doing it." Id. at 161.
9. 1 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 12.15 at 593
(1960). All states also require that the testator have attained a specified age. Id. § 12.8.

10. Id. § 12.15 at 593.
11. See id. § 12.21; Green, Judicial Tests, supra note 8.
12. 1 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, supra note 9, § 12.21.
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out, whatever its substance.1 3 Courts repeatedly criticize juries' tendencies to strike down, on mental competency grounds, wills of

which they disapprove.4 If the wishes set forth in the will are

deemed to be the testator's own, they may not be judged by others.
In this respect, the doctrines of testamentary freedom and capacity reflect notions that are fundamental to liberal political theory.

"The political doctrine of liberalism does not acknowledge communal values. . . . The individuality of values is the very basis of personal identity in liberal thought . , ." Values must be subjective

in this view: "an end is an end simply because someone holds it."'
6
13. In general, "one who has capacity may make a good will although
the terms
are 'as eccentric, as injudicious or as unjust as caprice, frivolity or revenge
can
dictate.'"
T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS, § 51 at 232 (2d ed.
1953) (quoting
Schneider v. Vosburgh, 143 Mich. 476, 479, 106 N.W. 1129, 1130 (1906)).
Noteworthy
exceptions to the general rule, in addition to those discussed previously
(see supra notes
3-6 and accompanying text) include devises violating the rule against
perpetuities and
devises for purposes opposed to public policy. See Friedman, supra note
2, at 355-65;
Scott, Control of Property by the Dead II, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 632 (1917).
14. See, e.g., In re Estate of Shay, 196 Cal. 355, 137 P. 1079 (1925);
Jackson's
Ex'r v. Semones, 266 Ky. 352, 98 S.W.2d 505 (1936); In re McCarbery,
243
Mich.
39,
219 N.W. 707 (1928); In re Dotterweich's Will, 210 A.D. 131, 205 N.Y.S.
580 (1924).
15. According to Unger:
Ends are viewed by liberal theory as individual in the sense that they
are always the objectives of particular individuals . . . The political
doctrine of
liberalism does not acknowledge communal values. To recognize their
existence, it would be necessary to begin with a vision of the basic circumstances
social life that took groups rather than individuals as the intelligible and of
primary units of social life. The individuality of values is the very basis
of personal identity in liberal thought ...
R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 76 (1975). See also Tushnet,
Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,Following the
96 HARV. L.
REV. 781, 783 (1983) ("Liberalism's psychology posits a world of autonomous
individuals, each guided by his or her own idiosyncratic values and goals, none
of which can be
adjudged more or less legitimate than those held by others").
Of course, as Tushnet has noted, "[a]ny summary description of the
classical liberal
view - the liberalism of Hobbes, Locke, and Mill and that of Dworkin
and
must be a caricature." Id. at 783 n.7. See also R. UNGER, at 8 ("[T]here Rawls is no one
thinker who accepts the liberal theory, in the form in which I present
it, as a whole, or
whose doctrines are completely defined by its tenets"). In this article,
I am less interested
in defining "liberalism" than in pointing out that some of
ideas central to the law of
wills are not unique to that branch of law alone, but ratherthe
resemble or
or not they are derived from) ideas found in other branches of law parallel (whether
and in political
theory.
16. R. UNGER, supra note 15, at 76. Some courts might reject Unger's
view and
argue that "true" and "universal" moral or other principles exist.
See Green, Proof of
Mental Incompetency, supra note I, at 301-I1. Nevertheless, all courts
standard of morality or other value may be imposed on a testator whose agree that no
does not violate public policy. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14. will otherwise
brace the liberal theory that "supposes that government must be neutral They thus emon what might
be called the question

of the good life." Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC

AND PRIVATE
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When judges admonish jurors not to strike down a will simply because it is not the will the jurors themselves would have made, those
judges affirm the individuality and subjectivity of values.

On the other hand, courts and commentators agree that the disalong with
positive provisions of a testator's will may be considered,
1" Differences exist in
capacity.
mental
other evidence, in determining
the evidentiary weight accorded to the will. In some states the will

may be considered only if there is additional evidence of incapacity
apart from the will, 18 while in other states the19will's provisions alone
may be sufficient to get the case to the jury. However, any use of
the will's substance to prove incapacity is problematic if wills law
truly is grounded in liberal individualism. If all values reflect individual choices which may not be judged by others, how can it be acceptable for a jury to find lack of capacity by looking at the individual testator's choices?

Some have answered this question by suggesting that the mental
capacity requirement has little to do with effectuating individual
choices but instead is designed to protect the testator's family from
disinheritance.20 This view concedes that the use of the will's dispositive provisions as evidence of incapacity restricts' 21individual freedom,
but argues that "this is no innovation in law." The argument, at
bottom, posits that it is acceptable for the court or the jury to consider the will because the policy of the mental capacity requirement
is regulatory, not facilitative.
This argument is questionable on several levels. First, it confuses
empirical observation with normative or prescriptive judgment. It is
(S. Hampshire ed. 1978).
17. See, e.g., Mileham v. Montague, 148 Iowa 476, 125 N.E. 664 (1910); Moran's Ex'r v. Moran, 248 Ky. 54, 59 S.W.2d 7 (1933); Ingalls v. Trustees of Mt. Oak
Methodist Church Cemetery of Mitchellville, 244 Md. 243, 223 A.2d 778 (1966); T.
ATKINSON, supra note 13, § 51 at 232.
18. See, e.g., Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh, 133 Iowa 1,6-7, 109 N.W. 1014,
1016 (1906); Wigginton's Ex'r v. Wigginton, 194 Ky. 385, 398, 239 S.W. 455, 461
(1922); Scally v. Wardlaw, 123 Miss. 857, 879, 86 So. 625, 627 (1920).
19. See, e.g., In re Lawrence's Estate, 286 Pa. 58, 66, 132 A. 786, 789 (1926)
(discussing, in dicta, the possibility of a disposition "so gross or ridiculous as to give rise
to a presumption of insanity"). See also infra note 52.
20. Green states:
[W]hen we seek the reason behind the rule that mental incompetency destroys the power to dispose of property by last will and testament, it is not
sufficient to invoke the policy of protecting the afflicted individual. His will
speaks only at the date of his death. By that time he is beyond the possibility of
the law's protection. If [the protective policy of the law] is to be used as an
explanation of the legal requirement of a sound and disposing mind, it must,
then, be referred to the protection of the family or dependents of the deceased.
Green, Public Policies, supra note 7, at 1216.
21. Green, Proofof Mental Incompetency, supra note 1, at 305. "In the field of
wills we find individual freedom restricted by the common law devices of dower and
curtesy and the statutory provisions which forbid a testator to leave less than a specified
percentage of his estate to his surviving spouse." Id. (footnote omitted).
MORALITY

1050

[VOL. 24: 1043. 1987]

Testamentary Capacity
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

possible that when a jury deems a testator mentally incompetent on
the basis of a will provision giving the entire estate to, say, a religious sect, the jury may be seeking through its finding to protect the
testator's family, who will receive the estate through the intestacy
statutes if the will fails. It does not follow that the purpose of permitting consideration of the will, or of the mental competency requirement generally, is family protection. Certainly courts do not
seem to regard family protection as a legitimate goal in the inquiry.
On the contrary, their repeated reminders to juries not to substitute
their notions of fairness for the testator's indicate a judicial belief
that using the mental capacity requirement to protect the testator's
family is inappropriate.
Second, the regulatory effects of holding a testator incompetent on
mental incapacity grounds are considerably more draconian than the
explicit regulations set forth in elective share statutes and the like.
Unlike a decision holding a will invalid, family protection statutes do
not defeat the testator's intent completely. Instead, under the statutes, the omitted share is supplied out of estate assets, with the remainder of the estate going to the beneficiaries named by the testator.22 The mental capacity doctrine, under which the entire will may
be held to fail, is obviously inconsistent with the far less intrusive
family protection policies embodied in elective share statutes.
Finally, assuming arguendo that family protection is the goal underlying the mental capacity requirement, the use of wills' dispositive provisions to prove capacity is a poor means to effectuate that
goal. Given the large number of factors bearing on the issue of
whether a will makes reasonable provision for the testator's family in
the circumstances,2 and the likelihood that different courts or juries
will have differing views of the fairness of the disposition under the
circumstances, the cases - and their message as to what constitutes
an acceptable degree of family protection - are bound to be inconsistent and unpredictable. 4 If family protection is sought, obviously
better ways exist to achieve it.2 5
22. See, e.g., U.P.C. §§ 2-201 to 2-207, 2-301(b), 2-302(c).
23. See, e.g., T. ATKINSON, supra note 13, § 52 at 245-46; Epstein, supra note
8,
at 241-42; Green, Proofof Mental Incompetency, supra note I, at 300-01.
24. Epstein, supra note 8, at 246; Fellows, The Case Against Living Probate,
MICH. L. REV. 1066, 1071 n.25 (1980); Note, Testamentary Capacity in a Nutshell: 78
A
Psychiatric Reevaluation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1142 (1966).
25. "Society's views concerning the bounds of dispositive freedom should be
pressed through a positive assertion of the legislature rather than manifested through exthe
individual predilections of a judge under the pretense of determining a testator's
mental
competency." Epstein, supra note 8, at 247.
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If family protection is not (or should not be) the policy behind the
mental capacity requirement, and if "the individual's freedom of disposition is still regarded as a fundamental concept in the willmaking
process,"2 then the use of a will's substantive provisions as evidence
of testamentary capacity remains problematic. Nevertheless, the
courts in testamentary capacity cases seem surprisingly untroubled
when they say in the same decision that, on the one hand, a competent testator is free to be irrational and, on the other, that an irrational disposition demonstrates incompetence. The apparent contradiction is avoided, in the eyes of most courts, by holding that the
will's provisions are but some evidence of incapacity, to be considered along with other evidence bearing on the testator's mental condition." Although this strategy seems to satisfy the courts, it does
not resolve the problem. If the testator's ends are for him or her
alone to choose, then any outside judgment of those ends is questionable, even if that judgment is not given conclusive evidentiary
weight. In point of fact, however, although the courts have sought to
formulate tests of capacity that respect the testator's choices, the
definitions they employ are not and cannot be neutral in regard to
the testator's ends.
WHAT IS MENTAL CAPACITY?

The traditional doctrinal requirements for testamentary capacity
- knowledge of property, the act to be performed, and the objects
of one's bounty - in practice have provided hardly more guidance
than the statutory standard of "sound mind." Thus courts and commentators have struggled to articulate precisely what it is that separates the competent from the incompetent testator. Two themes run
throughout their efforts. The first theme requires the testator to be
"rational" or to have exercised "reason." This test on its surface is
an objective one, in the sense that it looks toward an abstract ability,
something anyone can recognize, which one either has or does not
have. The second theme, in contrast, focuses not directly on the testator's ability to reason, but on his or her consistency with his or her
own "true" self. The testator is required to have made a will reflecting his or her own unique circumstances of belief, family and property. This self-consistency theme emphasizes not some abstract, objectively-recognizable ability, but instead requires the fact finder to
26. Id. at 246-47. See also Comment, A Case Against Admitting into Evidence
the Dispositive Elements of a Will in a Contest Based on Testamentary Incapacity, 2
CONN. L. REv. 616, 621 (1970) ("[W]hen considering the statute of wills, it should be
remembered that freedom from orthodox dispositions is the raison d'etre of the statute").
27. See, e.g., Coleman v. Robertson's Ex'rs, 17 Ala. 84 (1849); Donnan v. Donnan, 236 I1. 341, 86 N.E. 279 (1908); Smith v. Fitzjohn, 354 Mo. 137, 188 S.W.2d 832
(1945); In re Estate of Gandynski, 46 Wis. 2d 393, 175 N.W.2d 272 (1970).
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try to step into the testator's shoes and see the world through the
latter's eyes.
The rationality and self-consistency themes constitute divergent visions of how individuals come to know one another and, ultimately,
how much individuals share. The rationality theme posits that individuals recognize as common in each other only a mode of thinking
"rationality" or "reason." The self-consistency theme takes the
competing view that individuals can recognize and share other individuals' self-chosen ends.
Both themes purport to give effect to the notion that values are
subjective. Neither theme, however, can effectuate that notion neutrally. The rationality theme requires the finder of fact to analyze
and judge the testator's actual decisions in order to test the latter's
abstract ability to reason. Such judgment is inconsistent with the
view that an individual's choices may not be judged by others. The
self-consistency theme requires the finder of fact to empathize with
the testator in order to discover the latter's chosen values. Yet if, as
a strict view of the subjectivity of values suggests, one's choices define one's individuality, then true empathy is impossible: rather than
entirely abandoning his or her own individuality, the fact finder is
more likely to impose his or her own values than to "discover" the
testator's.
The following sections describe and contrast the rationality and
self-consistency themes. They conclude by examining the potential of
each theme to conflict with the strict view that values are subjective.
The Article's third section demonstrates that the courts which speak
in terms of the rationality theme in fact employ the self-consistency
standard and then implement that standard by requiring empathy on
the part of the finder of fact. Thus the operative standard in all
cases, whatever their rhetoric, is empathy. Moreover, courts are well
aware of the limits of empathy. By requiring empathy nonetheless in
the determination of capacity, courts implicitly reject the view that
the intent which wills law carries out is or can be purely the testator's own.
The Rationality Theme

From early on, American courts carefully have distinguished testators' feelings and moral beliefs from their intellect and reason,
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and28have held that only defects in the latter bear on mental capacity. The inquiry, courts say, must be directed to the presence or
absence of reason; if the abstract ability to reason is present, the
quality of its exercise is unimportant. 29 Capacity to comprehend, not
hold
actual comprehension, is what counts,30 and numerous cases
31
that errors in reasoning are not evidence of lack of capacity.
Under the rationality theme, then, the ability to reason dictates
nothing about its exercise. Indeed, some courts find the distinction
between the presence of reason and its exercise to be critical to freedom of testation a2 In point of fact, the separation of reason from its
exercise clarifies what freedom of testation is: it is the freedom to
exercise reason in accordance with one's own unaccountable
prejudices. 3 a
28. See, e.g., In re Forman's Will, 54 Barb. 274 (N.Y. App. Div. 1869) ("Moral
insanity is a disorder of the feelings and propensities. Legal insanity is a disorder of the
intellect. .

.

. Moral insanity

. . .

is insufficient to set aside a will.") The following jury

instruction, approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1849, is typical:
[T]he inquiry with you will be, was the man deranged, in the appropriate technical sense of the word, or was he merely the victim of unbridled passion? Was
reason dethroned, or had passion seized the rein and acquired mastery? ....
I need not say that there is a line, broad, clear, and well defined, though to our
imperfect senses oftentimes imperceptible, between the maniac, the man irrational and irresponsible, and he whose soul is seared by the burning lava of
human passions ...
Trumbull v. Gibbons, 22 N.J.L. 117, 139 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1849).
29. See, e.g., J. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, § 331 at 442-43: "[A] sound mind is
not determined by how well a man may talk or reason, the soundness of his judgment or
the propriety of his actions. The question is not how well he may talk and act, but can he
talk and act rationally and sensibly, has he mind and reason, has he thought, judgment
and reflection?" (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., In re Estate of Weil, 21 Ariz. App. 278, 281-82, 518 P.2d 995, 99899 (1974); Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 273, 112 S.W. 405, 411 (1908); Down v.
Comstock, 318 I11.445, 453, 149 N.E. 507, 511 (1925).
31. See, e.g., Owen v. Crumbaugh, 228 I11.380, 401-02, 81 N.E. 1044, 1051
(1907); In re Haness' Estate, 98 N.J. Eq. 645, 651-52, 130 A. 655, 659 (N.J. Prerog. Ct.
1925); Smith v. Smith, 48 N.J. Eq. 566, 570, 25 A. 11, 12 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1891).
32. There is a clear distinction between having the capacity to comprehend
[the deserts of the objects of one's bounty] and actually comprehending them.
The former the law requires; the latter it does not .

. .

. Care, therefore,

should be taken by the courts to see that the distinction mentioned is observed;
for it is precisely the one that public policy dictates and the law requires in
order to preserve the right and power of testamentary disposition.
McClintock, 87 Ark. at 274, 112 S.W. at 411. See also Kevil v. Kevil, 65 Ky. (2 Bush.)
614, 615 (1866) ("Gross inequality, apparently unjust or unreasonable, is not alone sufficient to invalidate a will. . . . The testamentary power is of great value both in its enjoyment and its results; and therefore it should be well guarded by the law, and sternly
upheld by the judiciary"); Trumbull, 22 N.J.L. at 141 (to measure capacity with reference to a will's justice "would be certainly subversive of that absolute control and dominion which the law gives to every man over his own property").
33.

We all have likes and dislikes . . . for which we might not be able to

give an intelligible reason, or one that would be satisfactory to another person,
who did not see with our eyes and hear with our ears, .

.

. and yet

. . .

be-

cause we make a will according to these peculiarities of our views, must it be
set aside? Better make a law that all a man's property should be divided

1054

[VOL. 24: 1043. 19871

Testamentary Capacity
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The notion that reason exists and can be recognized independently
of feelings bears strong traces of liberalism. "The first principle of
liberal psychology states that the self consists of understanding and
desire, [and] that the two are distinct from one another. . . ."" The
notion that others may not judge the testator's actual exercise of his
or her reasoning powers echoes the subjectivity of values. "What distinguishes men from one another is not that they understand the
world differently, but that they desire different things even when
they share the same understanding of the world. . . .The basis of
[men's] individual identities . . . must be the choices they make, the
5
ends they choose."'
Rationality and the Insane Delusion

In few cases is it argued that the testator lacked reason entirely.
Most cases involve the allegation that the testator suffered from an
"insane delusion" on one subject which affected particular dispositions in the will. In response to such allegations, courts have formulated varying definitions of "insane delusion. ' 6
Many courts define delusion as a belief with "no basis in reason."' 37 Such definitions are consistent with the more general position
that testamentary capacity exists only when a testator is capable of
reasoning. A large number of the definitions in this vein state that an
insane delusion exists where there is no evidence to support the testa-

tor's belief.3 8 Some cases define an insane delusion as that which no
"rational" or "sane" person could believe, apparently
postulating a
hypothetically "normal" person akin to the abstract "reasonable perequally among his relatives .... But so long as the law allows a man to do
what he will with his own, he may exercise his individual privilege of having
preferences and prejudices ... without his being called on to give any reason
further.
Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N.H. 120, 139 (1866).
34. R. UNGER, supra note 15, at 39.
35. Id. at 40.
36. See I W. BOWE & D. PARKER, supra note 9, § 12.30.
37. A delusion is the mind's spontaneous conception and acceptance of that,
as fact which has no real existence except in its imagination .... Mistake,
whether of fact or law, moves from some external influence which is weighed by
reason. Delusion arises from morbid internal impulse, and has no basis in
reason.
Smith v. Smith, 48 N.J. Eq. 566, 570, 25 A. 11, 12 (Prerog. Ct. 1891). See also Hooper
v. Stokes, 107 Fla. 607, 609, 145 So. 855, 856 (1933); Crumbaugh, 228 III. at 401, 81
N.E. at 1051; In re Estate of Millar, 167 Kan. 455, 460, 207 P.2d 483, 487 (1949).
38. See, e.g., In re Estate of Kendrick, 130 Cal. 360, 62 P. 605 (1900); Owen v.
Crumbaugh, 228 Ill. 380, 81 N.E. 1044 (1907); Ahmann v. Elmore, 211 S.W.2d 480
(Mo. 1948).
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son" of tort law.39 The two standards can be seen as closely related
because "that which no sane mind would believe at all does not rise
to the dignity of evidence" and thus "belief in something that no
sane man could believe in is evidence of insanity."40
The emphasis on external evidence for a belief, and on whether an
objectively rational person could hold the belief, presupposes that the
process of reasoning can be recognized wholly apart from the ends to
which that process is applied. To reason is to move from an evidentiary premise to a conclusion; sane people reason and thus can recognize reasoning. 41 An obvious kinship exists between these definitions
of insane delusion and the broader definition of mental capacity as
possession of the ability to reason.
The Self-Consistency Theme
The rationality theme in the law of mental capacity, with its emphasis on the testator's abstract ability to reason, suggests that
mental capacity can be judged objectively, by reference to what any
rational person would do in making a will. Yet many cases and treatises reject the idea of an objective standard, and suggest that an
objective test is inconsistent with free testation.42 In this view, the
abstract search for signs of reasoning is misguided. Instead, "the individual must be compared with himself' and "his ordinary modes
39. See, e.g., Hooper v. Stokes, 107 Fla. 607, 145 So. 855 (1933); In re Estate of
Millar, 167 Kan. 455, 207 P.2d 483 (1949). See also In re Estate of Bonjean, 90 Ill.
App. 3d 582, 584, 413 N.E.2d'205, 207 (1980) ("An insane delusion is an irrational
belier).
40. McClintock, 87 Ark. at 279, 112 S.W. at 414 (citation omitted).
Evidence is the means by which facts are proved. All evidence must be addressed to the sane mind. That which no sane mind would believe at all does
not rise to the dignity of evidence; A belief in something that no sane man
could believe is evidence of insanity. Evidence, in a legal sense, is external. . . . A belief grounded on evidence, however slight, necessarily involves
the exercise of the mental facilities of perception and reason.
Id. See also Smith v. Smith, 48 N.J. Eq. 566, 25 A. 11 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1891); Hooper
v. Stokes, 107 Fla. 607, 145 So. 855 (1933); Owen v. Crumbaugh, 228 II1.380, 81 N.E.
1044 (1907); In re Estate of Millar, 167 Kan. 455, 207 P.2d 483 (1949).
41. Even those who disagree with this description of reasoning agree that there is
a reasoning process common to all sane persons. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying
text.. See also In re Estate of Delaney, 131 N.J. Eq. 454, 457, 25 A.2d 901, 903 (N.J.
Prerog. Ct. 1942) ("Not every discomposure of the mind will render one incapable of
making a will; it must be such a discomposure, such a derangement, as to deprive one of
the rationalfaculties common to man.") (emphasis added).
42. "[T]he law of wills, unlike the law of torts, does not create for testators a
standard such as a reasonably prudent person, and demand that all testators and their
wills conform to it. Each is left free to do with his property as he wishes. . . ." Cline v.
Larson, 234 Or. 384, 394, 383 P.2d 74, 79 (1963). See also In re Estate of Alexander,
128 Neb. 334, 336, 258 N.W. 655, 656 (1935) ("[Testator] might have disinherited his
son entirely if he was so disposed. That was his right. Such is the purpose of the law in
empowering a man to dispose of his property by will.").
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of speaking, thinking and acting. '43
This self-consistency theme of mental capacity law asks whether
the testator has been true to his or her own unique experience and
beliefs. To make that assessment, the jury must put itself in the position of the testator 44 - it must empathize. Where the court can find,
in the peculiar circumstances of the testator's family history, a reason that apparently explains the testator's disposition, it will uphold
45
the will.
The self-consistency approach does not wholly abandon rationality
as a criterion for evaluating mental capacity; it simply redefines rationality as that which makes sense in the testator's circumstances.4 6
Nor does the self-consistency theme necessarily deny that values are
subjective. Indeed, it is precisely because a person's unique experiences give rise to his or her values that the fact finders must enter
into those experiences in order to assess capacity.4 7
43. The individual must be compared with himself... For the existence of
lunacy is not, in general, characterized so much by extravagance of thought,
compared with the average and ordinary mode of thinking of all men, as by
marked divergence, without the interpositionof any adequate external cause on
the part of the person whose mental condition is in question, from his ordinary
modes of speaking, thinking, and acting.
H. UNDERHILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 90 at 117 (1900) (emphasis original). See also J. ROOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 119 at 70 (1904) ("The
thought, desire or act which is claimed to show insanity must not be tried by any ideal of
propriety, but by comparison with the character of the sane person when he was sane").
44. See, e.g., In re Will of Mintzer, 5 Pa. 206, 211 (1863) ("[Y]ou must say by
your verdict, not what, in your opinion, is the moral character. . . of the will, but is this
will that of the testator - of Adam Mintzer, with all his natural peculiarities and frailties, or of Adam Mintzer, a monomaniac").
45. See, e.g., In re Estate of Shay, 196 Cal. 355, 237 P. 1079 (1925); Phillips v.
Johnson, 303 Ky. 574, 198 S.W.2d 305 (1946); Jackson's Ex'r v. Semones, 266 Ky. 352,
98 S.W.2d 505 (1936); Smith v. Fitzjohn, 354 Mo. 137, 188 S.W.2d 832, 834 (1945).
46. See, e.g., Newcomb's Ex'r. v Newcomb, 96 Ky. 120, 27 S.W. 997 (1894);
Jackson's Ex'r v. Semones, 266 Ky. 352, 98 S.W.2d 505 (1936); Smith v. Fitzjohn, 354
Mo. 137, 188 S.W.2d 832 (1945).
47. No greater injustice could be done, in many instances, by a testator, than
to so dispose of his property as to be what the world would call just. There are
so many circumstances occurring, in every family, that never reach the public
eye or ear, in which the conduct of children or relatives is disclosed, affecting, in
the most serious manner, the happiness of its members, that the parent alone is
competent to determine how much each member of his family is fairly and
justly entitled to, in the division of his estate.
Reynolds v. Root, 62 Barb. 250, 252 (N.Y. App. Div. 1862). See also In re Alper's Will,
142 N.J. Eq. 529, 535, 60 A.2d 320, 324 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1948), affid, 2 N.J. 104, 65
A.2d 736 (1949) ("It is for [the testator] ...alone to weigh those circumstances and
influences which in his own mind and conscience justify such variances in bounty as he
chooses to donate. This is true where the reason for the variance does not appear: a
fortiori where the reason is so abundantly present").
Courts adopting the self-consistency theme may be just as concerned with the testa-
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Self-Consistency and the Insane Delusion
The real departure of the self-consistency theme from the rationality theme is not on the question of whether values are subjective, but
on the ability of fact finders to discover the testator's values without
inappropriately imposing their own. The divergence between the two
themes is illustrated by a debate between two commentators early in
the twentieth century. Page objected to the definition of an insane
delusion as a mistake made without any evidence from which a sane
man could draw the conclusion drawn by the testator. He argued
that the definition was inherently defective because of its "assumption that it is well known what a sane man could or could not believe." 8 A more valuable test, Page suggested, would assess whether
the belief in question could be permanently removed by evidence,
because "a mistake made by a sane person is always susceptible of
correction. ' 49 Page's new test was entirely consistent with the conventional test; the presence or absence of abstract reasoning ability
remained crucial. He merely proposed that the presence of reasoning
was better assessed by looking to whether a wrong belief could be
corrected than by looking to the process by which the belief was
reached.50
Gardner disagreed entirely with Page's views:
If the jury-man assumes, as he must. . . that he is himself a rational man,
he then can form an opinion as to what he, as a rational man, could believe.
If, putting himself, with the help of the evidence, as nearly as may be in the

place of the testator, he can say that he can conceive of himself as thinking

or feeling as the testator felt or thought, he must then say that the testator
was free of insane delusions. But if he cannot conceive of himself - a rational man - thinking or feeling after the manner of the testator, he must
then say that the latter was insane.51

In stark contrast to the rationality theme, Gardner's vision assumes
that rational people can share more than just a way of thinking from
a premise to a conclusion or from a conclusion to a premise. Rather,
they can share a set of feelings, beliefs and responses. The latter is
tor's ability to reason as courts employing the rationality theme, and may differ with the
latter only as to the means by which reasoning ability is to be proved. For example,
consider a devise to the Catholic Church. Such a devise on its face might not raise
doubts as to the testator's reasoning ability. Yet if it were known that the testator had
devoted the whole of his or her life to the study and practice of Judaism, there might be
cause to question whether he or she was "reasoning" at the time the will was made.
Thus, courts may employ self-consistency as a device to determine rationality. However,
as is developed in the third section of this Article, all courts in practice rely on empathy,
whatever the stated goal of their inquiry.
48. W. PAGE, THE LAW OF WILLS § 151 at 261 (2d ed. 1926). Other scholars
agreed. See J. SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 130 at 151 (6th ed.
1915); H. UNDERHILL, supra note 43, § 91 at 120 n.l.
49. W. PAGE, supra note 48, § 154 at 264.
50. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.

51.
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made possible by empathy, by the fact finder putting himself or herself "as nearly as may be in the place of the testator." When a rational person exercises empathy he or she recognizes the testator not
simply as another reasoning being, but as himself or herself.
Rationality, Self-Consistency and the Use of the Will's Provisions
as Evidence of Capacity

Cases sounding the rationality theme and the self-consistency
theme alike hold that the fact finder may consider the will's dispositive provisions in evaluating the testator's mental capacity. The cases
are replete with statements that a natural, just or reasonable will
tends to demonstrate capacity, while an unnatural, unjust or unreasonable will casts doubts on capacity. 52 Predictably, courts differ on
the meaning they give terms such as "natural," "just" and the like.
Some cases, reflecting the rationality theme, compare a will's dispositive provisions with those an abstract "reasoning" person would
include. In these cases, courts often conclude that the will in question is "unnatural," "unjust" or "irrational" without defining those
52. See, e.g., Newman v. Smith, 77 Fla. 633, 82 So. 236 (1919); In re Estate of
Heazel, 74 Idaho 72, 257 P.2d 556 (1953); Moran's Ex'r v. Moran, 248 Ky. 554, 59
S.W.2d 7 (1933).
Despite some suggestions to the contrary (see, e.g., infra note 104 and accompanying
text), courts and commentators agree that the will never is conclusive evidence. "If it is
established that the testator lacked sufficient understanding when he executed his will,
the instrument will be declared invalid, no matter how natural and just its provisions
may seem." J. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, § 354 at 480. See also T. ATKINSON, supra
note 13, § 51 at 232-33 ("[T]he will of a person whose mind is unsound for testamentary
purposes is not valid, though the provisions are the same as he would likely have made if
he had possessed capacity.").
One of the reasons most commonly given for the proposition that the will never can be
conclusive is based on the utility of wills to command family loyalty and obedience:
The right [of a testator] to discriminate among his children in making a testamentary disposition of his property is one of the most valuable rights which he
possesses. By the exercise of this right he is enabled to enforce his commands
during his life. . . .He is enabled to punish the undutiful and disobedient, and
to reward those of his children who have given heed to his commands. . . .He
is enabled to secure for himself in his declining years the attention and care
that his age and physical infirmities require ...
H. UNDERHILL, supra note 43, § 105 at 146. See also 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *10-13:
[W]hen [property] became inheritable, the inheritance was long indefeasible. . . .Till at length it was found, that so strict a rule of inheritance made
heirs disobedient and headstrong ...and prevented many provident fathers
from dividing or charging their estates, as the exigencies of their families required. This introduced pretty generally the right of disposing of one's property, or a part of it, by testament. . . .(emphasis original.)
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terms,5 3 thus suggesting that it is possible to tell in the abstract,

without regard to any of the testator's specific views or experiences,
what a "rational" or "natural" disposition looks like. This suggestion
is found most strongly in insane delusion cases, where courts hold
that a will's dispositive provisions are relevant not on the issue of
whether the testator actually was deluded, but on the issue of
whether the delusion54caused the testator to make the particular dis-

positions in the will.
In accepting the will's admissibility on this issue, courts and commentators alike presume that the will - by itself and in the abstract
can demonstrate the influence of a delusion.55 The idea seems to
be that a "rational" will can be distinguished confidently from an
"irrational" will abstractly, by anyone, without reference to any
facts about the testator. The distinction is to be drawn on the basis
of the will's "justice" and "naturalness" (as opposed to "harshness"
or "injustice"), again considered abstractly and without reference to
the testator's particular experiences.
In adopting as their touchstone abstract notions of "justice" and
"naturalness" rather than conformity to the testator's lifetime beliefs, cases in this vein reflect the rationality theme. At the same
time, however, they illustrate how problematic it is to divorce an inquiry into the testator's ability to reason from the testator's presumptively subjective and unjudgeable goals. The rationality theme
posits that we can tell whether a testator has exercised reason without regard to the result the testator reached; "errors" in reasoning
are said to be of no account. 56 Yet courts which hold that a will's
abstract "injustice" is evidence of incapacity effectively define "reasoning" as reaching a particular result. This circularity is inevitable:
53. See, e.g., Maroncelli v. Starkweather, 104 Conn. 419, 426, 133 A. 209, 212
(1926); In re Estate of Heazle, 74 Idaho at 77, 257 P.2d at 558; Moran's Ex'r, 248 Ky.
at 559, 59 S.W.2d at 9.
54. See, e.g., McClintock, 87 Ark. at 277, 112 S.W. at 413; Rivard v. Rivard,
109 Mich. 98, 117, 66 N.W. 681, 688 (1896).
55. [T]he essential question is whether the insane delusion . . . has affected
the will and the particular disposition. If it has not, but the will appears just
and naturalin its provisions and duly executed, there is no reason why the will
should be refused probate. But, if, on the contrary, the insane delusion has evidently affected the provisions of the will, so as to lead its maker to bestow
harshly and unjustly . . . the will ought to be set aside. . . . [For] [t]he will
which delusion most suredly does not invalidate is, after all, a just and rational
one.
J. SCHOULER, supra note 48, § 138 at 163-64 (emphasis added). See also Hardenburgh
v. Hardenburgh, 133 Iowa 1, 7, 109 N.W. 1014, 1016 (1906) ("The children of the
testator are the natural recipients of his bounty, and, when they are entirely ignored in
the disposition of his property, it is prima facie an unnatural and unreasonable act"); In
re Estate of Gunderson, 160 Wis. 468, 473, 152 N.W. 157, 158 (1915) (if the will is in
accord with the "dictates of natural justice," strong evidence of lack of capacity is necessary to nullify the will).
56. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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the only way to evaluate the reasoning process so critical to the rationality theme is to resort to the human decisions which embody
that process and make it concrete.
Moreover, the particular result courts seek in considering the will
the "just" result -

purports to be one that any responsible fact

finder can recognize. That can be true only if all responsible people
share a single concept of the "just will." Yet the idea of a shared
concept of "justice" in this sense is at odds with the notion, ostensibly integral to both the rationality and self-consistency themes, that
all values are subjective.
Another line of cases defines a "rational" will as one that accords
with "the fixed purpose of the testator. ' ' 57 Many of these cases hold
that the contents of the will can be evaluated only in light of testimony or other evidence which may supply an explanation for an apparently unnatural, unjust or unreasonable disposition. 58 If this evidence demonstrates that the testator had a reason for making what
otherwise would seem a peculiar disposition, the apparently unreasonable disposition may be deemed to be no evidence of incapacity. 59
Cases in this vein define an "unnatural" will as a will that does not
conform to what is known of the testator's unique wishes.60 Thus,
this second line of cases uses a will's dispositive provisions exactly as
one would expect under the self-consistency theme: devises conforming to the testator's peculiar and individual views and circumstances are deemed to evidence capacity.
To summarize, the rationality theme focuses on the testator's ability to reason in order to avoid judging the result of the testator's
reasoning process. Ironically, however, courts nonetheless are forced
to rely on the result of the testator's reasoning process to assess the
testator's ability to reason. Cases under the rationality theme ask
57. Newcomb's Ex'rs, 96 Ky. at 124, 27 S.W. at 998 (1894).
58. See, e.g., Bales v. Bales, 164 Iowa 257, 145 N.W. 673 (1914); In re Will of
Mintzer, 5 Pa. 206, 210-11 (1863); In re Estate of Miller, 10 Wash. 2d 258, 116 P.2d
526 (1941); In re Estate of Von Ruden, 55 Wis. 2d 365, 198 N.W.2d 583 (1972).
59. See, e.g., New v. Creamer, 275 S.W.2d 918 (Ky. 1955); Smith v. Fitzjohn,
354 Mo. 137, 188 S.W.2d 832 (1945).
60. In a legal sense a will is unnatural only when contrary to what could be
expected of the particular individual in question, considering the type of man he
was as manifested by his views, his feelings, his intentions and the like. When
natural by this test, it cannot be said to be unnatural in the legal sense, however
much it may differ in [its] dispositions from those ordinary men make in similar
circumstances.
Cude v. Culberson, 30 Tenn. App. 628, 669, 209 S.W.2d 506, 524 (1947). Accord In re
Estate of Lavell, 122 Utah 253, 248 P.2d 372 (1952); In re Estate of Nelson, 72 Wyo.
444, 266 P.2d 238 (1954).
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whether the dispositive provisions of a will reflect some form of abstract "justice." In so doing, courts must assume that a generally
accepted and generally acceptable concept of justice exists against
which to compare what the testator has done. Such an assumption
flies in the face of the notion that values are purely subjective.
In contrast, cases under the self-consistency theme ask whether
the dispositive provisions of a will reflect what is known of the testator's values. This approach eliminates the need to posit a universal
standard or vision of justice, but it, too, is problematic. The selfconsistency theme requires a means by which the fact finder truly
can come to know the testator's values. The means the courts adopt
is empathy. If the subjectivity of values is taken seriously, discovery
of the testator's values through empathy is difficult to conceive: if a
person's individuality consists of the ends that person chooses, then
that person must abandon completely his or her identity to know
another's desires.
As is demonstrated below, even courts employing the rhetoric of
rationality rely on empathy as a means to evaluate capacity. Like
the quest for an abstract reasoning process, empathy is incapable of
yielding the testator's pure subjective intent. In adopting empathy
nevertheless as the mechanism for determining capacity, courts implicitly reject the notion that the "testamentary intent" which the
law of wills carries out is ever truly the testator's own.
UNCONVENTIONAL

DEVISES

If values truly are subjective and may not be judged by others,
then courts must seek a means of assessing mental capacity that is
neutral with respect to the value choices embodied in any particular
devise. Two categories of devises bring the problem of neutrality into
sharp focus: devises heavily influenced by the testator's religious beliefs, and devises slighting some or all of the testator's blood relations. In both categories, courts confront the tricky question of how
to judge -

or to avoid judging -

choices which necessarily reflect

the testator's own values about spiritual and family matters.
As discussed below, courts dealing with these two categories of
cases under the rationality theme often speak as if they were prepared to examine the will in question with reference to abstractly
"normal" or "conventional" wills. In evaluating capacity, the courts
seem to require testators' wills to conform to some general or abstract norm, thus contradicting their own statements that testators'
religious or family loyalties are matters of personal choice. Yet the
courts' rhetoric in this regard differs sharply from their practice: almost every case contains a particularized examination of the testator's religious or family history, and it is only in light of the testator's unique experiences that his or her ability to reason is assessed.
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Even those cases which appear most strongly to reflect the rationality theme in fact follow the standard which is explicit in cases reflecting the self-consistency theme. That standard holds that a will is
"unnatural" or "unconventional" - and therefore is evidence of
mental incapacity - only if it markedly departs from the testator's
peculiar lifetime loyalties and beliefs. In the end, then, the courts'
actual analyses manifest their view that empathy is the only way to
discover whether the testator was capable of formulating the intent
carried out by wills law.
Devises Influenced by Religious Beliefs
Courts broadly agree on the general proposition that an individual's religious beliefs are not evidence for or against capacity. 1 The
most common explanation for this proposition reflects the rationality
theme of mental capacity law in that it focuses on the impossibility
of demonstrating the truth or falsity of a religious belief.6 2 The concern of the rationality theme is a reasoning process, recognizable by
movement from an evidentiary premise to a conclusion. Sane people
recognize the process because they themselves engage in it.6 3 On the
subject of religion, however, sane persons draw radically different
conclusions from the same evidence 4 because they all do not understand the world in the same way. 5 As it is impossible either to assess
whether a particular event is an acceptable evidentiary premise for a
belief6 6 or to use evidence to prove a religious conclusion false, there
61. See, e.g., Woodruffis Ex'r v. Woodruff, 233 Ky. 744, 746, 26 S.W.2d 751,
752 (1930); Whipple v. Eddy, 161 Ill.
114, 122, 43 N.E. 789, 792 (1896); O'Dell, 149
Mich. at 158, 112 N.W. at 738; Ingersoll v. Gourley, 78 Wash. 406, 411, 139 P. 207,
209 (1914).
62. [An insane] delusion does not exist unless it is one whose fallacy can be
demonstrated, for except such demonstration can be made, it cannot be said that
no rational person would entertain the belief. Consequently, no creed or religious belief, insofar as it pertains to an existence after death, can be regarded as
delusion, because there is no test by which it can be tried and its truth or falsity
demonstrated....
Scott v. Scott, 212 II1.597, 603, 72 N.E. 708, 710 (1904). See also Irwin v. Lattin, 29
S.D. 1, 9, 135 N.W. 759, 763 (1912) (citations omitted) ("whether religious views...
are true or false is not a subject for judicial inquiry .... [T]he courts are without adequate means of producing evidence on a question of this character, or to determine the
value of such evidence.").
63. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Whipple, 161 Ii. at 122, 43 N.E. at 792 (1896).
65. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Crumbaugh, 228 111.at 407, 81 N.E. at 1053 (the fact that testator
accounted for certain events "by means of spiritual guidance, while another person ...
who did not believe in spiritualism, would account for the same phenomena in some other
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is no way to recognize whether the testator has "reasoned" where
religious beliefs are concerned.
In holding that religious beliefs cannot evidence incapacity because their truth or falsity is indemonstrable, courts repeatedly emphasize the importance of individual choice in matters of faith: "Our
Constitution guarantees religious liberty, and the statutory right to
make a will is not limited to those who discard a belief in any particular cult, dogma, or principle. ' 67 They note that if a court were to
assume a testator insane because the testator held a given belief, "it
would not fall very short, in principle, of assuming that all mankind
who do not believe in the particular faith which the judge accepts
."8 They similarly disapprove of
* * . are more or less insane ...
juries' inclinations to use incapacity verdicts to avoid devises to religious causes juries believe detrimental to society.69 These statements
appear to affirm the now familiar notions that values are a matter of
individual choice and should not be judged by others.
On the other hand, however, courts seem convinced that religious
beliefs held too intensely can destroy testamentary capacor other
ity.70 Religious beliefs may become, on some level, insane delusions
which render invalid will provisions affected by them.7 1 The question, of course, is how to determine whether a belief has become a
delusion and, if so, whether the delusion caused the testator to make
a challenged disposition. On this question, courts disagree.
One approach holds that a testator's belief rises to the level of an
insane delusion if it "usurp[s] the place of reason and control[s] his
way" is irrelevant to testator's capacity); O'Dell, 149 Mich. at 158, 112 N.W. at 738
(1907) ("One accepts his religious faith on evidence that is satisfactory to his [own]
mind."); Bonard's Will, 16 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 128, 183 (N.Y. 1872) ("To almost every man
The manifestations
there is, to him, some evidence that there is a higher power ....
which surround him on every side, confirm him in that belief").
67. Barr v. Sumner, 183 Ind. 402, 410, 107 N.E. 675, 677 (1915). See also
Bonard's Will, 16 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) at 184:
[F]reedom of individual conscience [is] favored by the society in which we
dwell, . . . and the multifarious forms and shades of opinion, on all subjects,
which are consequently engendered among us . . . must be tolerated . . . as
wise, or mistaken, methods of happiness, which each person has a right to select for himself.
See also In re Higbee's Estate, 365 Pa. 381, 384, 75 A.2d 599, 600-01 (1950) ("While
it is difficult ... to understand how or why a woman would bequeath her estate to an
agnostic society, . . . we must remember that under the law of Pennsylvania 'a man's
prejudices are a part of his liberty' ").
68. Bonard's Will, 16 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) at 184-85.
69. See, e.g., Carnahan v. Hamilton, 265 I11.508, 527, 107 N.E. 210, 217 (1914);
Crumbaugh, 228 Ill. at 412-13, 81 N.E. at 1055 (1907).
70. "A man may be insane about his religion, as well as about any other subject."
Nalty's Adm'r v. Franzman's Ex'r, 221 Ky. 709, 710, 299 S.W. 585 (1927). See also
Barr, 183 Ind. at 410, 107 N.E. at 677 ("[A] belief in any religious doctrine. . . may be
vitally material, in connection with other facts and circumstances, in determining the
question of one's testamentary capacity.").
71. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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will." 17 2 Beliefs are the product of individual choice; delusions, in
contrast, deprive the testator of the ability to choose.73 If the testator
has lost the ability to make choices for himself, he can no longer
reason or come to a rational judgment,74 and his will cannot be given
75
effect because it is not truly his will at all.

Cases adopting this approach imply both that individuals necessa-

rily will diverge in the conclusions they draw, and that they share a

common mode of reaching conclusions - the process of "reasoning."
The standard for distinguishing a belief (which supposedly is irrelevant to capacity) from a delusion (which may defeat capacity) again
reflects the rationality theme by focusing on an abstract ability -

the ability to choose. The emphasis on abstract reasoning ability or
choice provides a means of assessing capacity that appears neutral as

to any particular belief. Neutrality is essential if freedom of conscience is to be meaningful.

On the other hand, courts approaching cases in this way need

some concrete piece of evidence that demonstrates whether the testa-

tor was or was not capable of making choices. Courts often speak as
though that evidence is to be found in the will itself. For example, in
Ingersoll v. Gourley,76 the testator devised half of his estate in trust
to a fanatical religious leader named Gourley, for the benefit of widows, orphans and the poor. Gourley was given complete discretion as
to the amount, time and manner of disbursement of the trust. The
court held that "the will itself.

.

evidences" that the testator "was

72. Taylor v. Trich, 165 Pa. 586, 600, 30 A. 1053, 1056 (1895). See also In re
Murray's Estate, 173 Or. 209, 227, 144 P.2d 1016, 1023 (1944) (testatrix's mental disorder "took the form of religious frenzy which, we think, absorbed and dominated her
mind and judgment").
73. [A] believer in Spiritualism may have such extraordinary confidence in
spiritualistic communications ... that he is impelled to follow them blindly and
implicitly, his free agency is destroyed, and he is constrained to do against his
will what he is unable to resist. A will made under such circumstances is obviously not the will of testator, and is therefore not admissible to probate.
O'Dell, 149 Mich. at 158, 112 N.W. at 738.
74. See id. See also In re Murray's Estate, 173 Or. 209, 227, 144 P.2d at 1023
(1944) (due to her "religious frenzy," testatrix was "incapable of acting rationally upon
matters within the area in which her delusions ... manifested themselves"); Taylor, 165
Pa. at 602, 30 A. at 1056 (approving trial court's instruction that testator's capacity
must be upheld if his mind was not overpowered and controlled by his will so as to
prevent him from making a rationaljudgment).
75. "We need not speculate as to the ground upon which this conclusion rests. It
is utterly unimportant whether it rests upon the ground of absence of testamentary capacity, or ... upon the ground of undue influence." O'Dell, 149 Mich. at 158, 112 N.W.
at 738 (1907).
76. 78 Wash. 406, 139 P. 207 (1914).
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under a morbid and insane delusion as to the character, power, and
mission of Gourley" and that "in making his will he was influenced
by that delusion."" Such a holding apparently assumes that any will
giving similarly absolute discretion to a relative stranger could not
be an act of free 7agency.
There must be some things that no sane
s
testator would do.
This approach illustrates the difficulty of using an "objective" test
to effectuate the view that values are subjective. If each person's values are unique to him or her alone, then no disposition itself could be
evidence of anything other than the testator's values. The value neutrality sought by a standard which purports to look solely towards
the testator's ability to choose, as opposed to his or her actual
choices, is undermined by the need to use the testator's actual
choices as a means to evaluate capacity. Those choices necessarily
must be compared to the choices an abstractly "capable" person
could make. If there are some choices no such person could make,
then there must be some values all such persons share.
It is not clear, however, that even the courts which purport to inquire into the testator's abstract ability to choose actually take that
concern seriously. Whatever the rhetoric found in the opinion, almost every case contains a close examination of the testator's particular life experience, family relations and religious involvement. 9
Even in the Ingersoll case, where the court purported to find evidence of incapacity in the "will itself," the court described in detail
the testator's affliction with cancer and his decision to turn his lifetime business affairs over to Gourley. 80 The court's determination of
incapacity thus apparently was animated at least as much by the
possibility of undue influence as by the "will itself."
The fact that courts consistently undertake this sort of examination suggests that, regardless of what courts say, the will in question
rarely is assessed with reference to some abstractly "acceptable" or
"sane" will, but rather with reference to what the testator, with his
77. Id. at 411, 139 P. at 209.
78. See also Taylor, 165 Pa. at 604, 30 A. at 1057, defining the inquiry as
whether the will provisions rested on "an existing state of facts such as might [have]
influence[d] the action of a sane man[.]" This approach assumes that even though individuals will draw divergent religious conclusions from identical facts (see supra text accompanying notes 61-65), nevertheless some facts exist which no sane person could find
influential.
Courts which test rationality with reference to results, as the court in Ingersoll appeared to do, may hold a number of results to be "rational" or "reasonable." Yet they
suggest that some results are or could be indicative per se of irrationality. That suggestion conflicts with the notion that courts neutrally must carry out testators' wishes even if
they disapprove of those wishes.
79. See Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency, supra note 1, at 306 & n.181
(noting that "[e]videntiary facts occur in constellations. It is their combined effect which
persuades the trier of fact").
80. 78 Wash. at 407, 139 P. at 208.
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unique life and religious experience, would be expected to do. Indeed, courts often simply collapse the rhetoric of rationality into an

inquiry into self-consistency by requiring that a testator's ability to
reason be evaluated empathetically.81

The standard actually adopted in cases purportedly asking

whether the testator had the abstract ability to choose is used openly

in cases reflecting the self-consistency theme. In these cases, courts
explicitly connect mental capacity to the testator's own history of
beliefs. This second approach asks whether the testator's beliefs and
conduct conform to the beliefs and conduct of those who share his
religious faith.8 2 The standard here is not ability to choose in the
abstract, but actual choices consistent with the faith to which the
testator has subscribed.8 3
This approach also utilizes the will to assess capacity. However,
rather than asking whether an abstractly rational person would dispose of his estate as the testator did, the court asks whether the testator's disposition reflects the teachings of his or her religious faith.

If it does, then it may not be assailed on capacity grounds. Thus, in

In re Elston's Estate,8 4 the testator was alleged to be under an in-

sane delusion about his religion, causing him to disinherit four of his

eight children. The church to which the testator belonged held that

nonbelievers who behaved as had the four disinherited children

should be "rejected" and given no financial assistance. Because the
81. A belief which results from a process of reasoning from evidence ... is
not an insane delusion. An insane delusion is not established when the court is
able to understand how a person situated as the testator was might have believed all that the evidence shows that he did believe and still have been in full
possession of his senses.
Crumbaugh, 228 11I. at 401-02, 81 N.E. at 1051 (emphasis added).
82. "If [a testator] believes and practices things in connection with a religion
which he accepts and to which a substantial number of people adhere, which things are
contrary to the practices and beliefs of such religion, such beliefs and practices may be
shown as proof of mental incapacity." Nalty's Adm'r, 221 Ky. at 710-11, 299 S.W. at
585-86.
83. This standard potentially involves the court in assessing which choices truly
are consistent with the testator's faith. That potential was realized in Compton v. Smith,
286 Ky. 179, 185, 150 S.W.2d 657, 660 (1941), where the court held:
It is our view that a belief in communication with dead people by letters and
telephone and other physical and material means goes beyond a normal belief
in spiritualism. The words "spiritualism" or "spirit" would indicate that such
communication, if at all possible, would be by spiritual inspirations through a
higher power. . . . If Compton believed in spiritualism, it appears that such
belief was carried to such an abnormal and unusual extent as to indicate insane
delusions. . ..
As might be expected, Compton has not been followed.
84. 262 P.2d 148 (Okla. 1953)..
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testator's disposition accorded with the beliefs of his church, and was
not "a belief peculiar to, and subscribed to by, him alone," his capacity was upheld.85
This approach, like the approach which purports to assess the testator's ability to reason, looks to what people other than the testator
might do in their wills. Yet the people to whom the testator is compared are not abstractly rational people, but those who share the
testator's beliefs. Their probable dispositions are examined to ascertain not what a rational testator would have done, but what this testator, with his or her unique faith, would have done had he or she
acted on the basis of that faith. In this sense, the second approach
clearly expresses the self-consistency theme.
The routine inquiries into the testator's life history, the reformulation of the rationality theme into self-consistency terms, and the explicit comparisons between the testator's beliefs and those of others
who share his faith all evidence the courts' reluctance to posit universally held values and their suspicion of abstract standards. Regardless of what courts say, they in fact resort to empathy to evaluate mental capacity, thus suggesting that empathy is the only means
by which it is possible to "know" the testator on any meaningful
level. By embracing empathy, courts manifest a faith that we can
know others without inappropriately imposing our values on them.
Devises Ignoring the "Natural"Objects of a Testator's Bounty
Suits challenging a testator's mental capacity most often are
brought by family members disappointed by the testator's will. 6
Such suits find a ready-made basis in the requirement that, as a prerequisite to testamentary capacity, the testator must know the "natural objects of his bounty. ' 87 The disappointed heir's claim, in substance, is that the testator's failure to devise to the heir evidences the
testator's failure to recognize the heir as a "natural" object.
The dissatisfied heir's claim to be a "natural" object invariably
rests on his or her status as a taker under state intestacy statutes. 88
85. [I]t
cannot be said that the testator's belief that the contestants, having
been rejected from his church . . ., should not inherit . . . was a belief peculiar
to, and subscribed to by, him alone. On the contrary there is sufficient evidence
to support the trial court's finding . . . that similar views were "commonly entertained by a considerable number" of other members of his church ...
id. at 151.
86. See Epstein, supra note 8, at 241:
The attack on the testator's mental competency is often a mere litigative
trapping which the contestants assume to give them a pretext for challenging
the will, since the law presently provides no procedure by which they can argue
the real basis of their claim - i.e., that the will is unfair to them and they are
unhappy with the provisions made for them in it.
87. See Green, Judicial Tests, supra note 8, at 1204.
88. See Morris v. Morris, 279 S.W. 806, 807 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) ("The theory
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However, as one court put it, "[n]o one makes a will except to prevent the operation of some law of descent ..
."89 Indeed, freedom
of testation means that the testator has "the right to make a will
disposing of. .. [his] property . . . as he may see fit." 90 A testator
may disinherit his or her children, 9 ' his or her spouse,92 or any other
family member 93 because "the law does not undertake to prescribe
the duties of a testator to his family."94 Nor does the law require
"any particular grade of moral rectitude as an element of testamentary capacity."9 5
which underlies the statutes of descent and distribution is ... [a] natural one. In theory,
such course is the one which a person, prompted by the instincts and natural impulses
which in these matters ordinarily direct the actions of mankind, would have his property
go."). This theory clearly presumes an objective standard for assessing who is a "natural" object.
In explaining the kind of knowledge necessary to satisfy the requirement that the testator know the natural objects of his or her bounty, courts often speak as if certain
categories of blood relations are always (or never) "natural" objects. See, e.g., Norris v.
Bristow, 358 Mo. 1177, 219 S.W.2d 367 (1949) (defining natural objects as "those who
unless a will exists will inherit the property"). Compare Estate of Nolan, 25 Cal. App.
2d 738, 742, 78 P.2d 456, 458 (1938) ("collateral heirs are not, because of such relationship alone, natural or normal objects of bounty"). These statements seem to suggest that
the courts have established an objective test of "naturalness" and that some dispositions
are unnatural per se. Yet, as is explained infra, courts are not prepared to rely on an
objective test and instead tend to inquire whether a particular contestant would be a
"natural" object in light of the history and circumstances of his or her connection
to the
individual testator.
89. Breadheft v. Cleveland, 184 Ind. 130, 138, 110 N.E. 662, 663 (1915). See
also In re Estate of Shay, 196 Cal. at 364, 237 P. at 1083 (to say that testator did not
provide equally for family members "is but to say that he exercised his legal right of
testatmentary disposition instead of leaving his estate to be distributed according to the
law of succession"); Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Cole, 75 Colo. 264, 266, 226 P. 143, 144
(1924) ("[O]ne making a will is not bound to dispose of his property according to the
rules of descent").
90. Coleman v. Robertson's Ex'rs, 17 Ala. 84, 87 (1849). See also Kinne v.
Kinne, 9 Conn. 102, 106 (1831) ("Our law has kindly allowed our citizens to select the
objects of their bounty. . . . Dispositions of property, made in this way, are not unnecessarily to be disturbed."); In re Estate of Gorthy, 169 Neb. 769, 781, 100 N.W.2d 857,
864 (1960) ("No right of a citizen is more valued than the power to dispose of his property by will. . . . The very purpose of a will is ordinarily to produce inequality among
heirs of the same class for reasons that appear sufficient only to the testator.").
91. See, e.g., Donnan, 236 Ill. at 346, 86 N.E. at 282; Breadheft v. Cleveland,
184 Ind. 130, 110 N.E. 662 (1915); Addington v. Wilson, 5 Ind. 137 (1854).
92. See, e.g., Kevil v. Kevil, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 614 (1866). The testator's ability
actually to disinherit his or her spouse is limited by elective share statutes. See supra
notes 3 and 6 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Spratt v. Spratt, 76 Mich. 384, 43 N.W. 627 (1889); In re Dotterweich's Will, 210 A.D. 131, 205 N.Y.S. 580 (1924).
94. Knox v. Knox, 95 Ala. 495, 504, 11 So. 125, 128 (1891).
95. In re Tymeson's Will, 114 Misc. 643, 647, 187 N.Y.S. 330, 334 (Sur. Ct.
1921). See also Bohler v. Hicks, 120 Ga. 800, 804, 48 S.E. 306, 308 (1904) ("the law
permits an immoral man to make a will"); Mayo v. Jones, 78 N.C. 402, 406 (1878) ("it
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Courts recognize that even a wise person can be capricious in the

disposition of his or her property. 96 Yet "[t]he view which others
may take of what they may think [the testator] ought to have done,
can have no bearing on the construction of what [the testator] actually saw fit to do."' 97 The jury may not "say whether the testator
made what they conceive to be a proper disposition of his property,
and render a verdict accordingly." 98 Others' views are irrelevant because the testator's choices may not be judged by others. 90 The
choice of beneficiaries expresses the subjectivity of values; it is a
matter of the testator's "own mind and conscience" alone.
If the selection of devisees is up to the testator alone, the requirement that the testator know the "natural objects" of his or her
bounty cannot be construed to demand any particular disposition to
any particular person. As a result, what becomes critical "is not
whether a testator actually remembers the natural objects of his
bounty, but whether he has, when he makes his will, the capacity to
do so. '' 1°O Here, again, the rationality theme is evident, with its focus

on an abstract mental ability rather than a particular result.
Since capacity to recognize one's natural objects, rather than actual recognition, is the key to testamentary capacity, courts need
some standard to gauge the capacity to recognize. Such a standard
once again exemplifies the difficulty of using an abstract capability
as the touchstone:
[W]hile prospective heirs have no present legal interest in the testator's
property, the law regards their expectations as something which a competent testator will normally have in mind, for these expectations will by the
When
very act of making a testamentary disposition, be changed ....
viewed in this light it is obvious that the inquiry . . . must be focused on
whether the testator has the capacity to know who these objects of his
is a lamentable fact that the grossest immorality and considerable intelligence are found
together").
96. Tomkins v. Tomkins, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 92 (1829).
97. Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 559, 2 N.W. 814, 816 (1879).
98. Couch v. Gentry, 113 Mo. 248, 256-57, 20 S.W. 890, 892 (1892). Accord
Donnan v. Donnan, 236 I11.341, 86 N.E. 279 (1928).
99. [E]very testator ... must be held to be the sole and final judge as to the
manner of the distribution of his earthly estate amongst those who are the natural objects of his bounty. It is not the function or right of any court to obstrude
itself into the heart or mind of a testator and determine for him which of his
It is for him and him
children, if any, shall be favored and to what extent ....
alone to weigh those circumstances and influences which in his own mind and
conscience justify such variances in bounty as he chooses to donate.
In re Alper's Will, 142 N.J. Eq. 529, 534-35, 60 A.2d 320, 324 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1948),
affid., 2 N.J. 104, 65 A.2d 736 (1949).
100. Down v. Comstock, 318 Ill. 445, 453, 149 N.E. 507, 511 (1925). See also In
re Haness' Estate, 98 N.J. Eq. 645, 651-52, 130 A. 655, 658-59 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1925)
("It is not required . . . that [a testator] shall in fact correctly'ascertain the legal status
of each person who stands in natural relation to him . . . . The test is his ability to
exercise reason . . . with reference to them."); Morris, 279 S.W. at 807 (testator "must
be mentally capable of comprehending . . . the natural claims of those he disinherits").
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bounty are . . . and not whether in fact the testator appreciates his moral
obligations and duties toward such heirs in accordance with some standard
fixed by society, the courts or psychiatrists."0

While ostensibly repudiating any objective, state-imposed standard,
this formulation nonetheless posits a hypothetically "competent testator" who will "normally" have the claims of prospective heirs "in
mind." The capacity to reason about one's natural objects effectively
is defined as the recognition of the claims of one's prospective heirs.
Although the testator is free to disregard those claims, he lacks
mental capacity unless he can "appreciate the fact that those united
to him by ties of blood have natural claims upon his bounty.' 01 2 If
there are claims which all abstractly "competent" persons necessarily feel - whether or not they actually give effect to them in their
wills - then there must be some values which all such persons
share.
The concrete evidence demonstrating the testator's ability or inability to recognize the claims of his or her "natural" objects is, of
course, in the will itself. Courts with virtual unanimity hold that the
(un)naturalness, (un)reasonableness and (in)justice of the will may
be considered by the jury in assessing testamentary capacity. 03 And
some go so far as to hold that when the "natural recipients" of the
testator's bounty "are entirely ignored in the disposition of his property, it is prima facie an unnatural and unreasonable act."'1 4 Here
again, the neutrality sought by a standard focusing on the ability to
recognize is eroded by the use of the testator's actual choices to evaluate that ability.
As with devises influenced by controversial religious beliefs, courts
which seem to hold the testator's will to an abstract or universal
standard do not in fact do so. In Bales v. Bales,'0 5 for example, the
court's standard for evaluating mental capacity seemed to posit
claims which all "rational" or "reasonable" persons would accept.
The court thought it "proper" to examine which persons "naturally
101. In re Estate of Weil, 21 Ariz. App. at 281-82, 518 P.2d at 998-99 (citations
omitted; emphasis original).
102. Niemes v. Niemes, 97 Ohio St. 145, 157, 119 N.E. 503, 506 (1917) (emphasis original). But see Jarrett v. Ellis, 193 Ind. 687, 693, 141 N.E. 627, 629 (1923) (instruction which referred to testatrix's capacity to comprehend "the nature of the claims
of her daughter" disapproved on the ground that it "invaded the province of the jury by
assuming that the daughter had claims on the testatrix .... The law does not presume
the existence of any claim of a daughter to share in her mother's estate"). See also supra
note 78.
103. See supra notes 18-20.
104. Hardenburgh, 133 Iowa at 7, 109 N.W. at 1016 (citations omitted).
105. 164 Iowa 257, 145 N.W. 673 (1914).
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come" to mind as those "fairly entitled to recognition" by the

testator.'
Contrary to what might have been expected, however, the Bales
court did not discuss which relations and acquaintances might be
considered by an abstractly "reasonable" person. Instead it made a
particularized inquiry into the history of the testator's relationships
with those named in the will. Because the testator gave his property
"to those to whom he had every reason to be grateful, 10 7 the court
concluded that he had "recognized those ties and claims and obligations which a man of ordinary intelligence and rational judgment
would have recognized as binding upon him."10 Thus, what begins
as an apparent concern for abstract rationality ends as an inquiry
into self-consistency.
Many courts do not engage in the rhetoric of rationality. They
insist that it is for the jury to determine whether in fact the will can
be said to be unnatural, 10 9 and hold that in making that determination, the will alone is not and cannot be conclusive." 0 For a will is
not "unnatural" at all, in this view, unless the omission' 1or slighting
of a "natural" object is without "reasonable grounds."' 2
If the "reasonable grounds" for disliking or disinheriting a "natural" object were construed to mean reasons or motives that would
satisfy an "ordinary reasonable" person, then clearly the testator's
right to choose his or her devisees would be hollow - the testator
106. Id. at 261, 145 N.W. at 674.
It is proper . . . in determining [mental capacity] . . . for us to examine
somewhat into the relationshiop of the parties who are the subjects of his
bounty, and to see whether or not therein lies any evidence of indifference to,
or forgetfulness of, those who would naturally come into the mind of a reasonable and rationalperson as the ones fairly entitled to recognitionand thoughtful consideration in making a disposition of his property.
Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 264-65, 145 N.W. at 676.
108. Id. at 264, 145 N.W. at 676.
109. See, e.g., Councill v. Mayhew, 172 Ala. 314, 55 So. 314 (1911); Breadheft v.
Cleveland, 184 Ind. 130, 110 N.E. 662 (1915); Jewett v. Farlow, 88 1nd. App. 301, 157
N.E. 458 (1927).
110. See supra note 19.
111. [T]he will on its face is unnatural and unjust. It virtually disinherits the
children of the testator . . . but this of itself, raises no presumption of mental
incapacity . . . . When a testator has reasonablegrounds to dislike those nearest him and has exercised his lawful right to disappoint them in the execution of
his will, his conduct in doing so is not generally to be regarded as unreasonable
in the sense of evidencing mental incapacity.
Hamilton v. Morgan, 93 Fla. 311, 316, 112 So. 80, 82 (1927) (emphasis added). See
also Sutton v. Combs, 419 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Ky. 1967) ("It is natural that a person
recognizes his relatives as the natural objects of his bounty unless there is some reason
not to do so. Many reasons may exist to justify such failure"); McGinnis v. Kempsey, 27
Mich. 362, 368, 376 (1873) (approving a jury instruction to the effect that "we are not
to consider alone the fact that this person or that person is a blood relation to the testator. . . [T]he conduct of the child towards the parent [is] to be considered").
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could disinherit only for reasons acceptable to other people. Reasonableness in this objective sense, however, in fact is not required. Instead, a disposition must be assessed with reference to "what the
testator, from his known views, feelings and intentions would have

been expected to make.""' 2 Reasonableness, in other words, must be
assessed from the testator's point of view. The fact finder must seek

to stand in the testator's shoes, to empathize.

Indeed, the most striking aspect of opinions on the subject of tes-

tamentary capacity is the similarity of their structure. Virtually all
such opinions, after describing the will contest and any challenged
rulings by a lower court, go on to examine the evidence concerning
the testator's life -

particularly in the years immediately preceding

and following the execution of the will - in minute detail.11 3 If, on
the basis of that evidence, the court can find a reason for the testator's disposition in the circumstances, the will is upheld."14 The jury
must have access to both the will and the other evidence "in order

that they may determine whether the injustice of the disposition...
is apparent or real." '15
Devises reflecting unusual religious beliefs or family relations are
problematic for the law of testamentary capacity. Neutrality as to
those beliefs and relations is essential to wills law's premise that the
112. A will is unnatural when it is contrary to what the testator, from his known
views, feelings and intentions would have been expected to make. If the will is in
accordance with such views it is not unnatural however much it may differ from
ordinary actions of men in similar circumstances.
In re Estate of Miller, 10 Wash. 2d 258, 267, 116 P.2d 526, 531 (1941). See also Reynolds, 62 Barb. at 252 ("There are so many circumstances occurring, in every family, ...
in which the conduct of children or relations is disclosed ... that the parent alone is
competent to determine how much each member of his family is fairly and justly entitled
to"); Cline v. Larson, 234 Or. 384, 394, 383 P.2d 74, 79 (1963) ("[T]he law of wills...
does not create ... a standard such as a reasonably prudent person"); Cude, 30 Tenn.
App. at 669, 209 S.W. 2d at 524 ("[A] will is unnatural only when contrary to what
could be expected of the particular individual in question").
113. Technically, this examination is necessary because the issue on appeal often is
whether the weight of the evidence supports the verdict or judgment or whether the lower
court properly instructed the jury on the evidence before it.
114. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hayes, 55 Colo. 340, 350, 135 P. 449, 453 (1913) (a
disposition consistent with testator's situation, affections and previous declarations "is
itself a rational and legal evidence of no small weight to testamentary capacity"); Phillips v. Johnson, 303 Ky. 574, 579, 198 S.W.2d 305, 307 (1946) ("It is claimed that the
will under consideration here is an unnatural one. We do not so regard it. The close
relationship between the testatrix and the son who was favored in her will is a reasonable
basis for the terms of the will."); In re Estate of Von Ruden, 55 Wis. 2d at 375-76, 198
N.W.2d at 587 ("Whether a will is unnatural . . . must be determined from a consideration of all the surrounding circumstances.") (undue influence case).
115. Young v. Ridenbaugh, 67 Mo. 574, 586 (1878).
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testator's intent and choices, wise or foolish, must be given effect.
Nevertheless, all courts resort to the choices in the will itself to assess capacity. Such resort seems to undermine neutrality.
Courts respond to the dilemma in two ways. Some courts, reflecting the rationality theme of the doctrine of testamentary capacity,
look to the terms of the will for evidence of an abstract ability to
reason - an ability which all individuals presumptively share, regardless of their own personal and divergent values. This strategy,
however, seems doomed to be ineffective: it determines the testator's
ability to reason by reference to the conclusion he or she reaches,
contradicting the premise that a mentally competent testator is permitted to be irrational in the disposition of his or her property. Perhaps because this strategy is inherently circular, it is discussed more
in rhetoric than it is utilized in fact.
The vast majority of cases, reflecting the self-consistency theme of
testamentary capacity law, looks to the terms of the will for evidence
that the testator has done what one in his or her position might have
been expected to do. This strategy affirmatively requires the finder of
fact to empathize with the testator and to ask, "What would I do, if
I were the testator?"
This second strategy avoids the circularity of the first because it
does not posit universally accepted and objectively assessable norms
to which the will implicitly must be compared. Nonetheless, it is
dangerous because it assumes that the finder of fact truly can know
another person without imposing the fact finder's own values in substitution for the other person's. The most striking aspect of the law
of testamentary capacity may well be the courts' willingness to accept this risk.
While courts resort to empathy in an attempt to effectuate the
notion that values are subjective, empathy hardly is more neutral
with respect to the testator's values than the approach which purports to focus on the testator's reasoning process. As is developed in
the following part, the subjectivity of values, taken on its face,
dooms even the best-intended efforts to know another person; such
knowledge would require the fact finder to abandon completely his
or her own identity. Nevertheless courts do rely on empathy. In so
doing, they demonstrate a belief that "testamentary intent" may be
understood only through the process we use to understand others
during life. In that process, we give up our own identities to seek the
identities of others. We do so because, as members of a community,
we need others to do the same for us. To create the community that
will recognize our individuality, we sometimes must leave that individuality behind. It is almost as if the subjectivity of values can be
realized only by its negation.
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THE IMPLICATIONS OF EMPATHY

In its strongest form, the notion that values are subjective renders

empathy impossible. What makes a person an individual, distinct

from other persons and worthy of recognition by them, is that per-

son's unique values. To abandon one's own values, even for a mo-

ment, is to lose one's self. Yet this is precisely what is required of
jury members instructed to evaluate a testator's mental capacity by
standing in the testator's shoes. There is no way to guarantee -

and,

indeed, it is highly improbable - that the fact finder will repudiate
his or her own self-defining values in the search for another's. The
instruction itself embodies a value judgment - with which the fact
finder may disagree -

that it is "good" or "important" to know

another person. Moreover, there is no way to ensure a fact finder's

best efforts toward understanding or embracing the testator's pecu-

liar experiences and beliefs.
The difficulties of imposing or policing empathy make it possible
to abuse the doctrine of testamentary capacity.' 16 Without doubt,

testamentary capacity cases are inconsistent and one easily finds

opinions reaching divergent results on nearly identical facts." 7 The
ease with which the testator's choices may be overridden has given

rise to the suggestion that public policies concerning family protection, rather than the policies of liberal individualism, are at the root

of testamentary capacity law.118

Undoubtedly some truth exists in the observation, easily made in

any specific case involving a controversial devise, that courts or juries
may hold a testator incompetent in order to avert what they perceive

to be an unfair result. 1 9 Nevertheless, the view that testamentary
116. As one observer has noted:
Because of the abundance of inconsistent judicial decisions on the question of
mental competency, there has been a growing feeling among scholars that
many courts are subverting the protective function of testamentary capacity
and using the concept as a convenient way to impose their own ideas of fairness
or unfairness in the case of the individual will.
Epstein, supra note 8, at 240. See also Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency, supra
note 1, at 306-07 ("It is submitted that in determining the issue of mental incompetency,
more frequently than otherwise, courts are passing on the abnormality of the transaction
rather than on the ability of the alleged incompetent to understand the transaction");
Note, supra note 24, at 1128-32 (describing courts' "manipulative approach" to testamentary capacity cases).
117. For a striking example, see Fellows, supra note 24, at 1071 n.25.
118. See Green, Public Policies, supra note 7, at 1216; Green, Proof of Mental
Incompetency, supra note I, at 306-11. For a critique of this position, see supra text
accompanying notes 20-25.
119. One early treatise-writer expressly approved of such holdings:
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capacity law ultimately is social in purpose is problematic. It assumes that the purpose of wills law is at least as regulatory as it is
facilitative. Such an assumption reduces much of the law of wills to
pure rhetoric.
This cyncism is unnecessary. Much of the case law can be explained in a manner somewhat more consistent with the traditional
notion that the purpose of the law of wills is to carry out the individual intent of the testator. That explanation is found in the belief implicit in almost every case - that individual fact finders are and
must be ready, through empathy, to cast themselves aside in order to
understand another person's intent.
To be meaningful, this explanation requires an inquiry into and
reassessment of what it means to know another person's intent. The
most extreme form of the notion that values are subjective would
hold that such knowledge is impossible - desires ultimately are private, personal, self-chosen ends which cannot be justified through
reason and therefore cannot be, in any meaningful sense, explained.12 ° Were this formulation accepted, wills law, which takes
the testator's intent as its touchstone, would be absurd because its
goal is to carry out an intent it never can discover.
The use of empathy suggests, however, that courts in fact do not
in accept this formulation. Courts realize that fact finders see the
testator through the window of their own values. This realization is
implicit in the courts' repeated warnings that disapproval of the testator's wishes is insufficient grounds for overriding them. Yet, in admitting wills' dispositive provisions and evaluating them in light of
the other available evidence about testators' experiences and values,
courts accept that there is no way, other than through that window,
that testators can be known. As one commentator put it: "Perhaps
the party condemning is the one really in error. And yet can we
judge of others (and we must judge) except by our own experi' The only intent worth seeking, in this view, is the intent
ence?" 121
that can be found. The intent that can be found is never purely the
testator's own. The testator cannot be known any better or differently than any individual knows any other. Discovering testamentary
intent is fundamentally similar to discovering what another person
means when he or she speaks to us.
When one individual listens to another, he or she does "judge,"
Certain so-called truths must necessarily be obnoxious to public policy ....
Opinions are held by individuals conscientiously and firmly - as, for instance,
in favor of free love, community in property, subversion of civil authority, pure
atheism - which courts, though disposed to leave speculation free, may well
refrain from sanctioning, when it comes to an individual bequest to propogate.
J. SCHOULER, supra note 48, § 166 at 164.
120. R. UNGER, supra note 15, at 42, 59-60.
121. J. ROOD, supra note 43, § 130 at 75.
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and the judgment is made on the basis of the listener's "own experience." But that experience consists of more than the sum of the
physical events which have occurred in the listener's life. Part of an
individual's set of experiences is learning that another does not mean
by a single choice of words what the listener might mean by those
same words. Communication requires that we abandon, if only fleetingly, our understanding of given words or circumstances in favor of
another's, however imperfectly we may grasp it. The abandonment
of ourselves is not undertaken entirely for others. Only by reaching
towards others' individuality can we seek to ensure that our own individuality similarly will be recognized by others. Thus, we empathize, cast ourselves aside, to allow ourselves to be found. Individuality requires a community to recognize it. To be individuals in a
community we must take and accept the risks of seeking to understand and to be understood. The law of testamentary capacity embraces empathy in precisely this spirit.
Of course, there is an obvious difference between understanding a
testator and understanding a speaker during a lifetime conversation:
unlike the living speaker, the testator cannot further explain what he
or she meant. This only makes the need for empathy more pressing,
for if the testator cannot tell us who he or she was, how are we to
know but by giving ourselves up? And if we do not do so for others,
who will do so for us?
CONCLUSION

"Testamentary intent" is fundamental to the law of wills. If a person lacks such intent, the instrument expressing his or her wishes as
to the disposition of property after death will not be given effect as
his or her "will." If the instrument is admitted to probate, "testamentary intent" must be interpreted to determine what the testator
meant by what he or she said. The irony of the law of wills is that
the critical inquiry into the testator's intent can never be confidently
resolved, for the testator's death removes the sole person who might
provide the necessary answers.
If a testator had testamentary intent, the law generally will carry
out his or her wishes regardless of their apparent wisdom. Yet the
law often has recourse to those wishes - and especially to their wisdom - in ascertaining whether testamentary intent existed. The law
of wills seems incapable of attaining the neutrality required of it.
The difficulty of discovering "testamentary intent" only mirrors
the difficulty inherent in any communication between individuals.
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Communication requires each person to ascertain what another
means by the words he or she uses. The listener makes this discovery
only by accepting that the speaker might not mean what the listener
would mean by the same words, and by seeking to understand the
speaker's words from the speaker's perspective.
This is exactly what courts do in mental capacity cases, though
they do not always say so. The operative test of mental capacity requires the finder of fact to try and see the world from the testator's
point of view - if the will's disposition reflects that point of view,
the testator's capacity is upheld.
Of course, empathy is not an infallible way of knowing another
person. Inevitably, there will be times when a listener/fact finder
will fail truly to see things - or even to try to see things - from the
vantage of the speaker/testator. And unlike a person listening to a
living speaker, who can, when confused, ask, "What do you mean?",
the finder of fact in a testamentary capacity case cannot obtain more
information from the testator. Therefore, it is not surprising that
cases on testamentary capacity are inconsistent and unpredictable.
Yet the significance of testamentary cases lies not in their end results, but in the courts' consistent willingness to accept the risks of
empathy rather than resorting to the sterile abstraction of an objective standard.
Testamentary capacity is not the only doctrine of wills law in
which courts rely on empathy. The process of will interpretation also
requires the finder of fact to step into the testator's shoes in order to
ascertain what the writer meant by the words he or she used.12
Of course, neither interpretation generally nor empathy in particular would be necessary if words had fixed, inalterable meanings, as
the much-criticized "plain meaning rule" implicitly supposes. 12 3 Yet
that view has been discredited as a "fallacy [which] consists in assuming that there is or ever can be some one real or absolute meaning. In truth there can be only some person's meaning; and that person, whose meaning the law is seeking, is the writer of the
document."124
122. No one's mind is immediately accessible to any other. What we can observe are only those visible, audible, or otherwise sensible signs which others
produce. As we produce signs ourselves for the purpose of communicating
thoughts or emotions to others, we conclude that others produce their signs for
the same purpose of communication . . . . This process of concluding from the
signs used to the meaning meant to be conveyed is interpretation.
M. RHEINSTEIN, THE LAW OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES 390 (2d ed. 1955) (emphasis original). For a more skeptical treatment of the process of interpretation, drawing on deconstructionist linguistic and literary theories, see Peller, The Metaphysics of American
Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1171-75 (1985).
123. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2461-62 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1981).
124. Id. § 2462 at 198 (emphasis original). See also Holmes, The Theory of Legal
Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417 (1899) ("It is not true that in practice (and I know
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Assuming that interpretation is required to discover the writer's

meaning, empathy would remain unnecessary if the meaning of a

will could be determined objectively. 2 5 Yet because wills are, in
Wigmore's words, "unilateral acts," the "sense of the testator is
therefore . . . the ultimate criterion of interpretation." 2 6 The goal
of will interpretation is to identify the meaning the testator sought to

convey through the words he or she used because "interpretation

seeks essentially to reconstruct the transferor's circumstances and
state of mind . . 12

The rules governing the admission of extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent are notoriously complex and controversial, and no attempt is made here to describe or analyze them.'28 It is enough for
present purposes to note that the discovery of "the sense of the testator" generally is seen as requiring empathy. As one English judge
put it: "What you should do is to place yourself as far as possible in
[the testator's] position, taking note of the facts and circumstances
known to him at the time: and then say what he meant by his
words.'

29

In the case of interpretation, as with the assessment of mental cano reason why theory should disagree with the facts) a given word or even a given collocation of words has one meaning and no other.").
125. Holmes believed that interpretation could be based on objective principles,
even in the case of wills:
It is true that the testator is a despot, within limits, over his property, but he
is required by statute to express his commands in writing, and that means that
his words must be sufficient for the purpose when taken in the sense in which
they would be used by the normal speaker of English under his circumstances.
Holmes, supra note 124, at 420.
126. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 123, § 2467, at 231.
127. Halbach, Stare Decisis and Rules of Construction in Wills and Trusts, 52
CALIF. L. REV. 921, 922 (1964) (emphasis added).
128. For a description of these rules, see 4 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, supra note 9,
§§ 32.1 to 32.14; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 123, §§ 2470-2477, at 234-73.
129. In re Rowland, [1963] Ch.1, 10 (Lord Denning M.R., dissenting). See also
Hammel v. Barrett, 79 N.J. Eq. 96, 97, 81 A. 1106 (N.J. Ch. 1911) ("[T]his court may
entertain extrinsic evidence ... to the end that the court may be placed as nearly as
possible in the position of testator and thus better comprehend the meaning and application of the language used by him"); Stewart v. Selder, 473 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Tex. 1971)
("The sense in which the words were used by the testator is the ultimate criterion, and
the court may always receive and consider evidence concerning . . . material facts that
will enable the court to place itself in the testator's position at the time"); Hatcher v.
Hatcher, 80 Va. 169, 171 (1885) ("[l]n order the better to comprehend the scheme
which the testator had in his mind . . . the judicial expositor is permitted to place himself, figuratively speaking, in the very shoes of the [testator]"); 4 W. BOWE & D.
PARKER, supra note 9, § 30.8 at 52 ("[Tlhe court places itself in the position in which
testator was when he made the will, and the will is construed in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances").
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pacity, the process of empathy carries with it risks that the mental
operations "of the judge and testator cannot fully correspond. 13 °
Here again, what is remarkable is that, in resorting to empathy,
courts implicitly redefine what is "testamentary intent."' 3'
The intent we seek in ascertaining "the sense of the testator" is
not the testator's pure subjectivity. 132 The testator himself, in writing
his or her will, "knows that his words are to be applied . . . by
others over whom he may have not control . . .and in a future in

which he may have no part."' 33 Like lifetime speech, the act of writing a will presupposes an outside reader who necessarily is "other" to
the testator. It equally supposes not that the reader will succeed, but
that he will try to be the testator.
The law of wills, with its emphasis on effectuating the intent of
the testator, seems to posit an atomistic world of individuals isolated
from one another by their own subjectivity. The courts' actual treatment of the difficult issues raised in testamentary capacity and will
interpretation cases suggests a different view. The standards adopted
in these cases imply a vision of community in which each person,
realizing that he or she needs others to recognize his or her individuality, is prepared -

at least momentarily -

to abandon his or her
34

individuality in an attempt to know others.1 Whether such efforts
at self-abnegation can ever be wholly successful is unclear, but that
is not the point. What is significant about the cases is their assumption that each individual is and must be ready to try.

130. "Although [the] mind [of the judge] may be influenced by what he believes
the testator ... to have thought, the mental operations of the two men cannot fully
correspond." Chafee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 381, 399
(1941).
131. [T]he meaning of words is to be sought, not in their author, but in the
person addressed . . .not in the [testator] but in the [executor or legatee]
.... Words are but delegations of the right to interpret them, in the first instance by the person addressed, in the second and ultimate instance by the
courts who determine whether the person addressed has interpreted them within
their authority.
Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REv. 407, 424 (1950).
132. See id. at 409 ("It is a hallucination, this search for intent. The room is
always dark. The hat we are looking for is often black. If it is there at all, it is on our
own head.").
133. Id. at 423.
134. See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L.
REv. 205, 211-12 (1979):
Others ... are necessary if we are to become persons at all - they provide
us the stuff of our selves and protect us in crucial ways against destruction.... But at the same time that it forms and protects us, the universe of
others ... threatens us with annihilation .... Numberless comformities,
large and small abandonments of self to others, are the price of what freedom
we experience in society.
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